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Public Law 94-265, the Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act of 1976, generated requirements for the optimal
management of fishery resources of the United States. This
thesis examines, from the perspective of a government regu-
latory agency, the Coast Guard, the management problem facing
the Pacific Regional Council in developing a management plan
for the sablefish fishery of the California, Oregon and
Washington coast. Economic and biological considerations,
which make government regulation an apparently desirable
social alternative, are reviewed. A review and examination
is made of the Act, the preliminary management plan, the
sablefish fishery itself, including markets, the Coast Guard
relationship to the enforcement of the plan, and the current
status of the Councils plan development. Alternatives are
developed and critiqued with an orientation towards optimal
management of the fishery and indications as to the requisite
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This thesis will examine, from the perspective of a
government regulatory agency, the Coast Guard, the management
problem facing the Pacific Regional Council in developing
a management plan for the sablefish fishery of the California,
Oregon, and Washington coast. The primary intent will be
in general, to review the economic and biological considera-
tions which make government regulation an apparently desirable
social alternative. This will require a review of the
administrative mechanisms developed per the Fishery Conser-
vation and Management Act of 1976, Public Law 94-265; an
examination of the preliminary management plan for the sable-
fish, as prepared by the Department of Commerce; an examina-
tion of the sablefish fishery itself, including domestic
and foreign operations and domestic and foreign markets; an
examination of the Coast Guard relationship to the enforcement
of the sablefish management plan; and a review of the current
status of the Pacific Regional Council's management plan
for the sablefish fishery, which is in the process of being
developed. The alternatives developed by this thesis are
oriented towards optimal management of the fishery with
indications as to the requisite Coast Guard involvement for
enforcement.

B. WHY THE SABLEFISH FISHERY
The sablefish fishery and its management has been
selected for examination because it is a relatively small
and simple fishery and yet has a multi-national interest.
Fishery efforts for sablefish are primarily targeted solely
at sablefish rather than at multi-species targets. By
limiting the study to the sablefish fishery of California,
Oregon, and Washington, the geographic area involved lends
itself to relatively simple division for analysis and
management if deemed necessary. Additionally, the market
demand for sablefish and sablefish products has, both
domestically and abroad, been expanding with concomitant
increases in price. Finally, development of an optimal
management plan for a less complex fishery may provide some
insight and methods of analysis that would prove useful in
developing optimal plans for more complex fisheries.

II. FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT
OF 1976, PL 94-265
The contents of this chapter have been extracted from
PL 94-265. They have been edited and rephrased to facili-
tate presentation. This material is considered necessary
as background and for development of the rest of the thesis.
A. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Congress, responding to strong pressure from conserva-
tion groups, the U.S. fishing industry and various other
interest groups, and to a lack of action on the part of the
United Nations conference on the Law of the Sea, acted to
unilaterally establish a 200 mile fishery zone for the United
States. The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976, Public Law 94-265, was signed into law on April 13,
1976.
Congress based their actions on their findings that:
1.) The fish off the coasts of the United States consti-
tute a valuable and renewable natural resource that contributes
to the food supply, economy, and health of the Nation and
also provides recreational opportunities.
2.) Increased fishing pressure coupled with inadequate
fishery conservation and management practices and controls
has resulted in certain stocks of fish having been over-
fished to the point where their survival is threatened and
other stocks of fish have been so substantially reduced that
they could become similarly threatened.
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3.) Commercial and recreational fishing constitutes a
major source of employment and contributes significantly
to the economy of the Nation. Many coastal areas are
dependent upon fishing and related activities and their
economies have been badly damaged by the overfishing of
fishery resources at an ever increasing rate. Massive
foreign fishing fleets in waters adjacent to such coastal
areas have contributed to the damage, interfered with domes-
tic fishing efforts and caused destruction of the fishing
gear of United States fishermen.
4.) International fishery agreements have not been effec-
tive in preventing or terminating the overfishing of these
valuable fishery resources. There is danger that irrever-
sible effects from overfishing will take place before an
effective international agreement on fishery management
jurisdiction can be negotiated, signed, ratified and
implemented.
5.) Fishery resources are finite but renewable and thus
if placed under sound management before overfishing has
caused irreversible effects, the fisheries can be conserved
and maintained so as to provide optimum yields on a continuing
basis.
6.) A national program for the conservation and manage-
ment of the fishery resources of the United States is
necessary to prevent overfishing, to rebuild overfished
stocks, to insure conservation, and to realize the full
potential of the Nation's fishery resources.
11

7.) A national program for the development of fisheries
which are underutilized or not utilized is necessary to
assure that our citizens benefit from the employment, food
supply, and revenues which could be generated thereby.
B. FISHERY CONSERVATION ZONE
Congress, through the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976, established the Fishery Conservation Zone as
a zone, contiguous to the territorial sea, with an outer
boundary being a line drawn in such a manner that each point
on it is 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the
territorial sea is measured. The Act claims exclusive
fishery management authority over all fish within this zone.
Additionally, it claims exclusive fishery management authority
over all anadromous (fish which spawn in fresh or estuarine
waters of the United States) species throughout their range,
except within the fishery conservation zone of another nation
recognized by the United States and over all Continental
Shelf fishery resources (Appendix A) that extend beyond the
zone.
However, the Act does exclude the United States from
exclusive management authority over species of tuna which
are deemed to be "highly migratory". The logic behind this
exclusion is undoubtedly influenced by the United States
tuna industry which does not want to recognize the 200 mile





The Act authorizes foreign fishing within the fishery
conservation zone, or for anadromous species or Continental
Shelf fishery resources beyond the zone only if all of the
following criteria are met:
I. A Governing International Fishery Agreement (GIFA) is
negotiated between the United States and the foreign nation.
The GIFA constitutes a binding commitment on the part of the
foreign nation and its fishing vessels to comply with the
following terms and conditions:
A. ) The foreign nation and its fishing vessel operators
must abide by the regulations prescribed by the Act and
the applicable fishery management plans implemented
pursuant to the Act.
B.) The GIFA requires the operators of the foreign
fishing vessels to permit boardings, searches and inspec-
tions at any time, by an officer authorized under the Act.
This officer with reasonable cause as a result of the
search or inspection may make arrests for violations and
seize the vessel. He is also authorized to examine and
make notations on the vessel's fishing permit.
C.) It requires that the permit issued, pursuant to the
Act, to each vessel, be prominently displayed in the
wheelhouse.
D.) It requires, if the Secretary of Transportation so
determines, that transponders or other appropriate position
fixing and identification equipment be installed and
maintained in working order on each vessel.
13

E.) It requires that duly authorized United States
observers be permitted on board any such vessel and that
the United States be reimbursed for the cost of such
observers.
F.) Fees required pursuant to the Act must be paid in
advance.
G.) Agents, who are authorized to receive and respond
to any legal process issued in the United States with
respect to the owners or operators, must be appointed
and maintained.
H.) It requires responsibility be assumed, in accordance
with any requirements prescribed by the Secretary of
Commerce, for the reimbursement of United States citizens
for any loss of, or damage to their fishing vessels^
fishing gear, or catch which is caused by any fishing
vessel of that nation.
I.) It requires compliance with any other monitoring,
compliance, or enforcement requirement relative to
fishery conservation or management that may be included
in the agreement.
J.) It prohibits the foreign nation and the owners or
operators of all the fishing vessels of the nation, in
any year, from exceeding that nation's allocation of the
total allowable level of foreign fishing.
II. There is an allowable level of foreign fishing only
when the total harvest of United States vessels is less than
the optimum yield of that fishery. An allocation of this
14

allowable level is made by the Secretary of State in coop-
eration with the Secretary of Commerce. In making such a
determination they consider:
A. ) the extent to which the fishing vessels of the
foreign nation have traditionally engaged in fishing
in the fishery;
B.) the cooperation with the United States and substan-
tial contributions made to fishery research and the
identification of fishery resources;
C.) the cooperation with the United States in enforce-
ment and with respect to the conservation of the fishery
resources; and
D.) such other matters as the Secretary of State in
cooperation with the Secretary of Commerce deems
appropriate.
III. Foreign fishing will be authorized only if the foreign
nation satisfies the Secretary of Commerce and the Secre-
tary of State that it extends substantially the same fishing
privileges to fishing vessels of the United States, if
any, as the United States extends to it's vessels.
Briefly stated the Act requires that the governing
international fishery agreements (GIFAs) referred to above
are 1.) negotiated by the Secretary of State, 2.) trans-
mitted to both Houses of Congress by the President, and
3.) either approved or disapproved by both Houses of
Congress after a 60 day minimum time period.
15

The Act requires that no foreign fishing vessel shall
engage in fishing within the fishery conservation zone, or
for anadromous species or Continental Shelf fishery resources
beyond the zone, unless it has on board and prominently
displayed in the wheelhouse, a valid permit. An application
for this permit is to be made annually, by the foreign nation
to the Secretary of State, for each vessel that it wishes
to engage in the fishery. The Secretary of State publishes
the permit application in the Federal Register. The Secre-
tary of State transmits the application to the Secretary of
Commerce with his comments and recommendations. He trans-
mits a copy of the application to the appropriate Regional
Council, to the Secretary of Transportation, and to the
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of
Representatives and to the Committees on Commerce and Foreign
Relations of the Senate.
Within 4 5 days of receipt, the Regional Council prepares
and submits to the Secretary of Commerce its written recommen-
dations including any restrictions. The Regional Council
is to consider the comments of any interested parties which
have been submitted to them.
The Secretary of Commerce, after consulting with the
Secretaries of State and Transportation and after considering
the Regional Council's comments, makes the determination
whether the application is approved or not.
If the application is approved, a copy of the approval
is transmitted to the Secretary of State for transmittal
16

to the foreign nation; the Secretary of Transportation; the
appropriate Regional Council; and the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries and the Senate Committees on
Commerce and Foreign Relations.
If the application is disapproved the Secretary of
Commerce promptly informs the Secretary of State of the
disapproval and his reasons therefore. The Secretary of
State, in turn, notifies the foreign nation of the dis-
approval and the reasons. The foreign nation, after taking
into consideration the reasons for disapproval, may submit
a revised application.
The Act provides that reasonable fees shall be paid to
the Secretary of Commerce hy the owner or operators of any
foreign fishing vessel for the issue of a permit. The
Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the Secretary of
State establishes and publishes the fee schedule. In
determining the level of the fees, the Secretary of Commerce
may take into account the cost of carrying out the provisions
of the Act with respect to foreign fishing including but
not limited to, the cost of fishery conservation and manage-
ment, fisheries research, administration and enforcement.
D. NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR FISHERY CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT
Congress, through the Act established the following
national standards for fishery conservation and management:
1.) Conservation and management measures shall prevent
overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the
optimum yield for each fishery.
17

2.) Conservation and management measures shall be based
upon the best scientific information available.
3.) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of
fish shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and
interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or
in close coordination.
4.) Conservation and management measures shall not dis-
criminate between residents of different states. If it
becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing privileges
among various United States fishermen, such allocations
shall be fair and equitable to all such fishermen; reasonably
calculated to promote conservation; and carried out in such
a manner that no particular individual, corporation or other
entity acquires an excessive share of such privileges.
5.) Conservation and management measures shall, where
practicable, promote efficiency in the utilization of
fishery resources, except that no such measure shall have
economic allocation as its sole purpose.
6.) Conservation and management measures shall take into
account and allow for variations among and contingencies
in fisheries, fishery resources, and catches.
7.) Conservation and management measures shall, where
practicable, minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication,
Based on these national standards the Secretary of
Commerce is to establish guidelines to assist the Regional
Councils in the development of fishery management plans.
18

E. REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCILS
To insure that fishery management plans are sensitive
to local situations and problem areas, the Act required the
establishment of eight Regional Fishery Management Councils
as follows:
1.) The New England Fishery Management Council which con-
sists of the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut and has authority over the
fisheries in the Atlantic Ocean seaward of these States.
2.) The Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council which
consists of the States of New York, New Jersey, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia and has authority over
the fisheries in the Atlantic Ocean seaward of these states.
3.) The South Atlantic Fishery Management Council which
consists of the states of North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, and Florida and has authority over the fisheries
in the Atlantic Ocean seward of these states.
4.) The Caribbean Fishery Management Council which con-
sists of the Virgin Islands and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico and has authority over the fisheries in the Caribbean
Sea and Atlantic Ocean seaward of these states.
5.) The Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council which
consists of the states of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, and Florida and has authority over the fisheries
in the Gulf of Mexico seaward of these states.
6.) The Pacific Fishery Management Council which consists
of the states of California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho
19

and has authority over the fisheries in the Pacific Ocean
seaward of these states.
7.) The North Pacific Fishery Management Council which
consists of the states of Alaska , Washington, and Oregon
and has authority over the fisheries in the Arctic Ocean,
Bering Sea, and Pacific Ocean seaward of Alaska.
8
.
) The Western Pacific Fishery Management Council which
consists of the state of Hawaii, American Samoa, and Guam
and has authority over the fisheries in the Pacific Ocean
seaward of these states.
The voting members of each Council are the principal
state official with marine fishery management responsibility
and expertise in each constituent state as designated by
the Governor of the State; the regional director of the
National Marine Fisheries Service for the geographic area
concerned; and the Council members appointed by the Secretary
of Commerce from lists of qualified individuals submitted
by the Governor of each applicable constituent State.
The nonvoting members of each Council are the regional
or area director of the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service for the geographic area concerned; the Coast Guard
District Commander as designated by the Commandant of the
Coast Guard; the executive director of the Marine Fisheries
Commission for the geographical area concerned; and a
representative of the State Department designated for the
purpose by the Secretary of State.
20

Each Council is charged with the responsibility to:
1.) prepare and submit to the Secretary of Commerce a
fishery management plan with respect to each fishery within
its geographical area of authority and such amendments to
each plan as necessary over time;
2.) prepare comments on any application for foreign
fishing transmitted to it by the Secretary of State;
3.) conduct public hearings at appropriate times and in
appropriate locations in the geographical area concerned
so as to allow all interested persons an opportunity to be
heard in the development of fishery management plans and
amendments to such plans, and with respect to the adminis-
tration and implementation of the provisions of the Act
itself;
4.) submit to the Secretary of Commerce an annual report
on the Council's activities during the year, periodic reports
as deemed necessary by the Council and any other relevant
report which may be requested by the Secretary of Commerce;
5.) review on a continuing basis and review as appro-
priate the assessments and specifications made with respect
to the optimum yield from, and total allowable level of
foreign fishing in, each fishery within its geographical
area of authority; and
6
.
) conduct any other activities which may be required
or are deemed appropriate or necessary.
The fishery management plans prepared by the Councils
must have the following required provisions:
21

1.) They must be consistent with the national standards,
the other provisions of the Act and any other applicable
law.
2.) They must contain a description of the fishery
including the number of vessels involved, the type and
quantity of gear used, the species of fish involved and
their location, the cost likely to be incurred in manage-
ment, actual and potential revenues from the fishery, any
recreational interests in the fishery, and the nature and
extent of foreign fishing and Indian treaty fishing rights
if any.
3.) They must assess and specify the present and probable
future condition of, and the maximum sustainable yield and
optimum yield from, the fishery, and include a summary of
the information utilized in making such specifications.
4.) They must assess and specify the capacity and the
extent to which fishing vessels of the United States, on an
annual basis, will harvest the optimum yield as well as the
portion of the optimum yield remaining which can be made
available for foreign fishing.
5.) They must specify the pertinent data which are to
be submitted to the Secretary of Commerce.
Additionally the Act provides the Councils with the
discretionary authority to include the following in the
management plan:
1.) They may require a permit to be obtained from and
fees to be paid to the Secretary of Commerce with respect
22

to any fishing vessel of the United States fishing or wishing
to fish, in the fishery conservation zone, or for anadromous
species or Continental Shelf fishery resources beyond the
zone.
2.) They may designate zones where and periods when,
fishing shall be limited, or shall not be permitted, or
shall be permitted only by specified types of fishing
vessels or with specified types and quantities of fishing
gear.
3.) If necessary and appropriate for the conservation
and management of the fishery, they may establish specified
limitations on the catch of fish, based on area, species,
size, number, weight, sex, incidental catch, total biomass,
or any other factor deemed appropriate.
4.) They may prohibit, limit, condition, or require the
use of specified types and quantities of fishing gear,
fishing vessels, or equipment for such vessels, including
devices which may be required to facilitate enforcement of
the Act.
5.) They may, as long as they are consistent with the
provisions of the Act, incorporate the relevant fishing
conservation and management measures of the coastal state
nearest to the fishery.
6.) They may establish a system for limiting access to
the fishery in order to achieve optimum yield, however
they must take into account:
23

A.) present participation in the fishery,
B.) historical fishing practices in, and dependence
on, the fishery,
C.) the economics of the fishery,
D.) the capability of fishing vessels used in the
fishery to engage in other fisheries,
E.) the cultural and social framework relevant to
the fishery, and
F.) any other relevant considerations.
7.) They may prescribe such other measures, requirements,
or conditions and restrictions which are determined to be
necessary and appropriate for the conservation and management
of the fishery.
Following the development of the plan or an amendment-
to an existing plan by the Council, it must be submitted"
to the Secretary of Commerce for approval. The Secretary
has 60 days within which he must either approve the plan,
partially disapprove it, or totally disapprove it. If
partially disapproved, the Secretary returns it to the
Council with an explanation of objections. The Council
then must satisfy the objections and resubmit the plan
within 4 5 days. In making his approval or disapproval
decision the Secretary of Commerce must consult with the
Secretary of State concerning foreign fishing matters and
the Secretary of Transportation concerning matters dealing
with Coast Guard enforcement at sea.
24

Upon approval, the Secretary of Commerce publishes the
plan in the Federal Register. Interested persons then
have 4 5 days within which to submit in writing, data, views,
or comments on the plan. The Secretary may hold a hearing
if he deems it necessary on the plan. To the extent prac-
ticable, the plan, following any hearings and the 4 5 day
period, will be put into effect in a manner which does not
disrupt the regular fishing season.
F . ENFORCEMENT
The provisions of the Act and pursuant to it the Regional
Council management plans will be enforced by the Secretary
of Commerce and the Secretary of Transportation through
the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Coast Guard.
However, the enforcement section of the Act allows the
Secretaries to, by agreement, on a reimbursable basis or
otherwise, utilize the personnel, services, equipment,
including aircraft and vessels, and facilities of any other
Federal agency, including all elements of the Department
of Defense, and of any state agency in the performance of
enforcement duties.
Authorized enforcement officers may:
1.) arrest any person, if he has reasonable cause to
believe that such person has committed an act prohibited
by the Act;
2.) board and search or inspect, any fishing vessel
which is subject to the provisions of the Act;
25

3.) seize any fishing vessel, together with its fishing
gear, furniture, appurtenances, stores and cargo, which is
used or employed in, or with respect to which it reasonably
appears that such vessel was used or employed in, the
violation of any provision of the Act;
4.) seize any fish, wherever found, taken or retained
in violation of any provision of the Act; and
5.) seize any other evidence related to any violation
of any provision of the Act.
The enforcement officer may execute any warrant or
other process issued by any court of competent jurisdiction
as well as exercise any other lawful authority.
If an authorized enforcement officer finds that a
fishing vessel is operating in violation or has been operated
in violation of the Act, he may in lieu of the above, issue
a citation to the owner or operator of th^ vessel. If a
permit has been issued, the officer shall note the issuance
of the citation on the permit. The Secretary of Commerce
is to maintain a record of all citations issued pursuant
to the Act.
G. PRELIMINARY MANAGEMENT PLAN
The development of the various management plans by the
Regional Councils can take several months or even years,
consequently the Act requires that the Secretary of Commerce
develop a preliminary management plan for each fishery to
fill the void between the enactment of the Act, 1 March 1977,
26

and the approval of the Regional Council prepared plans.
These preliminary management plans are generally broad in
scope and not particular in detail. They have been pub-
lished in the Federal Register and thus provide initial
guidelines for management and enforcement.
H. INTENT OF CONGRESS
From the Act, it can be concluded that the stated intent
of Congress charges the Secretary of Commerce, through the
Regional Councils, for the development of management plans,
and the Coast Guard and National Marine Fisheries Service
for the enforcement of these plans, to optimally manage the
fishery resources of the United States for the benefit of
the nation. It is not simply, as some would have it, to
exclude foreign fishing if domestic fishing efforts are
capable of completely handling the harvest. Therefore, it
follows, that management plans prepared subordinate to the
Act, are required to govern the fishing activity of U.S.
fishermen as well as foreign fishermen.
To this point in time, the U.S. fishing industry has
come under relatively little regulation as compared with other
industries. What regulation there has been, is primarily
limited to a few species of fish, such as halibut and salmon.
It is true in our society, that demands for government
of a public nature have been increasing. Along with the
growth in management requirements and the production of
increased services, the regulatory functions of government
have expanded quite rapidly.
27

III. THE SABLEFISH FISHERY
A. DISTRIBUTION AND LIFE HISTORY
The geographic distribution of the sablefish, or coiranonly,
blackcod, Anoplopoma fimbria ^ ranges from northern Mexico
northward along the entire Pacific Coast of the United States
and Canada to Alaska, westward along the Aleutian Island
chain and the Continental edge in the Bering Sea to the coast
of Siberia and down to the northeastern coast of Japan.
Sablefish occupy a wide range of depths with the pelagic
eggs and larvae in surface waters, juveniles in surface
and inshore waters to a depth of approximately 150 meters
and adults from 150 meters down to over 1200 meters.
Although tagging studies conducted by Japan, the United
States, and the Republic of Korea (Sasaki et. al, 1975)
indicate that some sablefish conduct extensive migrations
within the range. Low [19 76] reported that the inter-area
exchange of sablefish is slow and that the majority of these
fish are apparently localized and do not migrate long dis-. =
tances. Low et. al [1976] reported that there is an inter-
change of fish between the inshore and offshore regions.
Juvenile fish are found in the shallower waters along the
coast, and as they mature and grow larger, they migrate
into the deeper waters offshore. The adults tend to stay
in the deeper waters, from 150 meters down, year round,
with spawn and larvae carried inshore, and along the
Pacific Coast, southward by surface currents.

Sablefish are known to live in excess of 20 years of
age, however, the exploited biomass primarily consists of
fish 3 to 8 years of age [Low et al 1976] . Generally the
size of the fish in pounds is approximately equal to its
age. Thus a 7 lb. fish is likely to be 7 years of age.
It takes approximately 5 to 7 years for sablefish to
achieve sexual maturity [Edson 1954, Philips 1954, Pruter
1954]
.
Spawning takes place once a year during the winter
in waters 250-750 meters deep [Thompson 1941, Bell and
Gharrett 1945, Kodolov 1968]. Small females may produce
around 100,000 ova and larger females over 1 million ova
[Philips 1954] . The ova, after being spawned, rise to the
surface where they develop into larvae and eventually into
•fry [Low et al 1976] . It is during this stage that predation
is the greatest, with many fish feeding on the sablefish
larvae and fry. Additionally, several parasites and dis-
eases affect the sablefish population.
Still much remains to be learned of the life history,
behavior and community ecology of the sablefish. Very
little is known of its relationships with other commercially
harvested species such as halibut, hake, flounders, rockfish,
and cod.
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE FISHERY
Sablefish have been fished for by U.S. and Canadian fish-
ermen for nearly a century as a target fish when halibut
was not in season. The Pacific Coast sablefish resource has
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been fished heavily only since the early 1960 's when Japan
entered the fishery soon followed by the Soviet Union,
Republic of Korea, Republic of China, Poland, German
Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany and Bulgaria
In 1976, the fishery off California, Oregon, and Washing-
ton found the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China
in a directed fishery for sablefish and the Soviet Union,
Japan, Poland, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic
in an incidental fishery through their trawlers directed
for hake. These vessels ranged from approximately San Luis
Obispo, California as a southern limit for the Koreans,
to the Canadian border on the northern limit.
United States fishermen utilize two distinct methods
of harvesting sablefish. The trawl fishery is basically
a bottom dragging operation that targets on several bottom
dwelling species including sablefish. Small domestic
trawlers operate out of just about every small port along
the coast. In the past, some have considered sablefish as
a rough fish and discarded it because the market was so
poor for it. The longline or trap fishery is a static gear
setting operation. It tends to be located only out of
certain ports along the coast, probably more a function of
an established market than of where the fish are located.
In recent years there has been a general increase in the
domestic sablefish fishery effort, with a particularly large
increase off California. A factor in the recent increase
in domestic fishing was the refinement of a sablefish trap
which greatly improved the harvesting process.
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C. VESSELS AND GEAR
The fishing vessels of the sablefish fishery off the
Pacific Coast generally fall into three types:
1.) The large foreign stern trawlers with gross tonnages
up to 5000 metric tons and a capability to electronically
locate and monitor schools of fish; pull huge trawl nets
through the water, maneuvering the mouth of the nets up or
down to follow the schools of fish; completely process with
automated machinery, the fish into frozen filets and the
wastes into oil and meal; hold up to 900 tons of processed
fish in massive freezer holds; and remain at sea for months
at a time. These vessels normally do not target on sablefish
but catch them incidentally to other directed fisheries.
2.) The foreign longline-trap combination vessels with
gross tonnages up to 500 metric tons and a capability to
set several longlines with a total of hundreds of hooks or
set several hundred traps; electronically locate concentra-
tions of fish; completely process either manually or in some
cases with automated machinery, the fish into frozen filets;
hold up to 100 tons of processed fish in freezer holds;
and remain at sea for months at a time. These vessels
target on sablefish and may operate in small fleets to
facilitate location and harvest of fish concentrations.
3.) The domestic trawl or longline-trap combination
vessels are small with gross tonnages up to 50 metric tons.
Domestic vessels have varying capabilities. They generally
can set fewer longlines or traps than foreign counterparts.
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Their electronic gear is generally much more limited in
capability than the foreign vessels. If any processing is
done on board it is all manual and consists only of heading
and gutting. Generally fish are iced down although some
vessels do have freezer compartments. The method of opera-
tion is to chill the fish to preserve it until it can be
delivered to the processing facility ashore. Those vessels
rigged for trawls are much more limited by depth and use
much smaller nets in comparison to the foreign trawlers.
The domestic vessels have limited holds and generally small
crews
.
The nature of the domestic fishery is such that fishing
trips range from day trips to no more than a few weeks
.
They very often operate singly and at times jealously guard
discoveries.
The development of the sablefish trap has probably been
the greatest single contributor to the recent growth of the
domestic sablefish fishery. In California for example, the
trap catch went from less than 4% of the total landings in
1971 to more than 58% in 1974. The trap tends to be species
specific/ attracting and capturing only sablefish. The fish
captured are of high quality and tend to be larger in size,
perhaps due to either the failure to attract or the ease of
escape for smaller fish. The trap has several other advan-
tages including greater safety for the operator and ease
of operation.

Sablefish taken by trap or longline generally command
a higher price per pound than those taken by trawl because
they are larger sized and generally in better condition.
D. FOREIGN FISHERY IMPACT ON DOMESTIC FISHERY
The primary impact of unregulated foreign or U.S. fishery
operations on the sablefish fishery of the California to
Washington coast is resource depletion through direct compe-
tition for stocks of sablefish. This competition in 1976
was especially acute with the Republic of Korea vessels
along the entire coast. They often fished in the exact same
areas as the U.S. fishermen, thus harvesting from the exact
same stock of fish. The incidental catch by foreign trawl
fisheries, though small, also impacts on the availability of
stock for the domestic fishery. The foreign trawl operations
are very often in close proximity to domestic operations.
The next greatest impact of foreign fishery operations
on the domestic fishery is in the area of gear conflicts.
A gear conflict would be defined as the fishing operation of
one vessel interfering with, damaging, or destroying the
fishing gear of another vessel. The primary cause of gear
conflicts on the Pacific Coast are foreign trawling activi-
ties which run over, snag or destroy U.S. fishermen's long-
lines or trap sets. The trawler or the trawl itself either
cuts off or destroys the end marker floats making it impossi-
ble to retrieve the gear or by snagging the float lines and
dragging them off for some distance making them extremely
difficult if not impossible to relocate. The blame, if any.
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cannot be placed solely on the foreign vessels however, for
the end markers or floats are often very difficult to see
and thus avoid. Many a domestic fisherman has been unable
to relocate his own sets due to slight navigational errors
in position fixing or due to severe weather which can also
destroy or relocate the markers.
Gear conflicts are very difficult to prove unless they
are actually witnessed. Transiting commercial vessels can
destroy the end markers. Unscrupulous domestic fishermen
can steal them for the catch or for even the gear in more
brazen cases. Nevertheless, the gear lost is often very
expensive running in cases to the thousands of dollars,
consequently gear conflict charges are often very emotion
packed. The foreign nations will at times agree to settle
the claim even without proof to avoid running the risk of
jeopardizing their fishing opportunities.
To help alleviate the gear conflict problem a joint
effort was developed whereby U.S. fishermen would report
their gear set positions to the Coast Guard or the National
Marine Fisheries Service, who in turn would advise the foreign
fishing fleets of their position. The foreign fleet expedi-
tion commanders would in turn advise all of their vessels,
directing them to remain clear of the reported positions.
Many problems arose, however. In particular, U.S. fishermen
would advise of sets but not of hauls, thus foreign vessel
charts soon became cluttered with gear positions where in
fact there was no gear. Additionally, U.S. fishermen would
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often report positions that were slightly off, perhaps to
protect "secret grounds" from fellow U.S. fishermen. Still
other U.S. fishermen simply elected not to use the system
at all.
A second method to avoid gear conflicts, among other
purposes, was the establishment of no-trawling pot sanctuar-
ies in certain limited areas. These were areas where, by
bilateral agreements with the foreign nations involved prior
to 19 77 and by the preliminary management plan since then,
foreign trawling was prohibited in order to protect pot
(trap) - longline gear. This method of course, was success-
ful only if the U.S. fisherman set his gear in the sanctuary
areas.
E. SABELFISH PRODUCTS
Domestically caught sablefish are primarily used for
human consumption with only 3% used as industrial products
or animal food [Low et al 1976J . Smoked sablefish has been
the primary product produced from the domestic sablefish
harvest. Only the larger fish are used for smoking, however,
because of the shrinkage which results from the smoking
process. Sablefish are also pickled or salted, again, the
demand is for the larger fish so that sufficient cuts of
flesh are available for processing. The smaller fish are
generally prepared as fresh or frozen steaks or filets. These
smaller fish are often marketed as butterfish [Frey 1971]
.
The butterfish filet has become increasingly in demand in

the U.S. market [Low et al 19 76] as an alternative to more
expensive species of fish, and other protein sources.
Foreign caught sablefish are primarily marketed as
filets and steaks, with only a small percentage pickled
or salted. Japan is a major consumer of sablefish. The
Koreans have indicated that the major portion of their catch
has been marketed in Japan. Although little is known for
sure, it is believed that the Soviets, Poles, and other
Eastern European nations primarily use sablefish for human
consumption [Low et ai 1976]
.
F. PRIOR REGULATION
The sablefish fishery has had very little restriction
placed upon it over the years.
In 1937 an incidental catch regulation for Pacific hali-
but was imposed by the International Fisheries Commission,
which indirectly affected the sablefish fishery. For each
pound of halibut sold, the fisherman must sell 7 pounds of
other species not including salmon or tuna [Crutchfield and
Zellner 1962]. This regulation was removed in 1966.
In 1955, Washington adopted a minimum size regulation
in response to industry concern over the capture of small
sablefish by trawls and its potential impact on the condi-
tions of sablefish stocks. This regulation was removed in
1971.
In 1956, Washington adopted a closed season between
November 1 and December 31, however this was lifted in 1958
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following the Pacific Marine Fisheries Commission recommen-
dation that it be abolished [DiDonato 1970]
.
In 1975 and 1976 through bilateral agreements with
Japan, the Soviet Union and Poland in the form of direct
and indirect catch quotas, vessel and gear limitations and
area-time closures, some control of foreign fishing was
affected. However, no agreements were reached with the
Republic of Korea and their fisheries expanded in number
of vessels and areas fished during this time period. It
is interesting to note that several of these Korean vessels
were registered in Panama, flew the Panamanian flag, but
had Korean crews.
G. PRELIMINARY MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE SABLEFISH FISHERY
In February of 19 77, pursuant to the requirements of
Public Law 94-265, the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976, the Secretary of Commerce published in the
Federal Register a preliminary fishery management plan for
the sablefish fishery of the Eastern Bering Sea, and the
Northeastern Pacific Ocean. This plan became effective with
the effective date of the Act, 1 March 1977. The sablefish
fishery of California, Oregon, and Washington, is subordinate
to this plan until it is amended or a new plan is developed
by the Pacific Regional Council.
The preliminary management plan, in defining the status
of the sablefish stock of the California-Washington region,
defined the sablefish abundance as "stable and high". This
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determination was made based on 1974 catch levels. This
was prior to the major Korean sablefish fishery expansion.
Because of the stable and high status, the plan deemed that
no reduction in 1974 catch levels was necessary. The pre-
liminary plan defined the annual total allowable catch (TAC)^
for the California-Washington as 7000 metric tons. The
U.S. catch in 1974 was estimated to be at least 6100 metric
tons
.
In defining the total allowable level of foreign fishing,
the plan explains that subsequent to the Republic of Korea
expansion in the sablefish fishery in 1974, U.S. sablefish
fishermen off Washington and Oregon have reported poorer
catch rates and a greater loss of gear due to foreign fishing
activities as opposed to earlier years. The plan goes on to
state, "Because of declining catch rates in the Washington-
California area and the adverse economic impact foreign
fisheries have created on U.S. sablefish fishermen, com-
pounded with the growing importance of sablefish to the
U.S. consumer and the domestic production potential to catch
all of the 7000 mt of sablefish equilibrium yield, there
should be no foreign fisheries for sablefish off Washington-
California. "
As it has been published, the plan is very general. It
defines the total allowable catch as 7000 mt, indicates
that the U.S. sablefish fishermen are capable of harvesting
the entire TAC, and that therefore, there should be no
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foreign fishery allowed. It places no limits or require-
ments on the U.S. fishermen.
The 7000 mt TAG figure apparently assumes that the
heavy Korean fishing pressure from 1974 to 1976 had no
significant effect on the sablefish stock, so that 1974
catch figures are still valid in defining the TAG.
H. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS
Based on personal observation and discussion with
fishermen, fish brokers and buyers. National Marine Fisheries
Service personnel, state fish and game personnel, and staff
members of the Regional Gouncil, the following observations
'. are made concerning the sablefish fishery of the Galifornia,
Oregon and Washington coast.
Although the sablefish population ranges along the
-
— entire coast with good population density, as revealed by
various population studies, the U.S. fishing pressure tends
to be concentrated in small, limited geographic areas, which
appear to be more a function of traditional fishing grounds,
homeport, or specific market location rather than apparent
fish density. The motivation to remain on traditional
grounds appears to be very strong. This is particularly
evident in the Monterey Bay area, where, according to a
California Department of Fish and Game official, the fishing
pressure has increased significantly in recent years with
a resultant decrease in catch per unit effort and a decrease
in average fish size. The fishermen appear hesitant to
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venture outside their traditional grounds in spite of the
poor returns. Yet, just south of the Monterey Bay area,
in 1976 the Koreans were observed taking substantial catches
of large fish. The explanation as to why the fishermen do
not venture further away appears to be a sociological one.
The Monterey Bay sablefish fisherman, for the most part is
a holdover or a decendent of the formerly great sardine
fishery of Monterey Bay. They have strong- family ties in
Monterey and wish to be home every night if possible. Thus
they "day trip", that is, they go no farther than they
can successfully transit to, fish, and return from in one
day.
This contrasts with some of the Fort Bragg fishermen,
who generally tend to set their sablefish gear in a location
that is adjacent to or enroute to albacore or salmon grounds,
They set their gear, go off to fish in the other fishery,
returning in a few days to retrieve their gear.
In neither case above does the location of the best
sablefish grounds appear to be a primary determinant of
the fishing site.
There is a marked difference in the price paid to the
fishermen for sablefish along the coast. In a recent,
informal telephone survey, prices for large (over 7 pound
headed and gutted) sablefish ranged from 30<: per pound to
90<: per pound. Generally, the prices appeared to be higher
in Washington and Oregon than they did in California. The
explanation for this is not clear since the market is
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international in scope. In both areas there appears to be
growing foreign buying pressure on the market. Additionally,
in both areas there has been a recent increase in the demand
for "butterfish", the small sablefish. Perhaps a nationally
organized selling market does not function well because the
catch sizes are so small and locally landed.
Related to the above observation, there is every indi-
cation that the market for sablefish, both small and large,
is about to expand much more quickly than it has in the past.
The small "butterf ish" , are being discovered as an economical
alternative to other higher priced, species of fish. Fish
consumption generally, is growing, as consumers discover
fish to be an economical, nutritional, low cholesterol, pro-
tein source alternative. This market expansion is most
notable in the fresh or frozen filets of the smaller fish.
However, processed fish are also gaining in popularity.
There are indications that ever increasing numbers of
foreign buyers will be entering the market place. This is
already very much the case in the salmon and crab markets
.
Several Alaskan crab canneries process crab solely for a
Japanese market. To be economical, foreign buyers must
enter the market with orders for large quantities of fish.
With the traditionally inelastic supply of fish, these
large purchases could result in large, rapid price increases.
Finally, with respect to the management plan itself,
the Regional Council has assigned to its "ground fish"
committee the responsibility of preparing the draft of a
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management plan for the sablefish fishery. It is to be
incorporated in the larger plan which is also to include
plans for other ground fish species, some of which include
hake, rockcod, ocean perch and the bottom fish such as sole
but not including halibut. The upshot of this is that this
plan, because of all the species in it, will take a con-
siderable amount of time to prepare and be approved. It
is particularly complicated by the fact that this large
plan will include hake. The hake is the primary target
fish of the large foreign fishing fleets. Thus, it would
be expected that the other species in the plan would appear
less significant in comparison and perhaps receive less
attention and effort. In any case, the best estimate of
when the plan could be completed at the earliest is sometime




Since economics is, among other things, the science
of studying the allocation of scarce resources so as to
maximize the benefit or value to society, it is desirable
to spend some time analyzing the economics of the sablefish
fishery. The basic resources to be allocated, for which
economic theory is concerned, are capital or money, labor,
and, of course, the sablefish population. These resources
are the factor inputs of the sablefish fishing industry.
The factor input, sablefish, presents unique economic issues
because the fish population is a renewable resource. The
benefits received by society from the sablefish fishing
industry include profits and a high protein source, both
of which are easily quantified, and such difficult to quan-
tify benefits as job satisfaction, security, and recreation.
Thus, from an economic perspective, the task facing the
Regional Council is to develop a mangement plan which will
control the amounts and mix of these input resources in such
a manner as to maximize the present value of their future
output benefits to society.
A. COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY
Micro-economic theory tells us that there are three
basic industry types; 1) Perfect competitors, 2) Pure
monopolies, and 3) Oligopolies. No one industry precisely
fit any one industry type however, some industries are
actually at points midway between the basic types.

Perfect competition is characterized by; 1) The elements
in the industry each act as price takers. Through their
actions they can control neither the price of inputs nor
the price of outputs. 2) The products of the industry are
homogeneous, that is, the product of one element in the
industry is the same as the product of any other element.
3) All resources are perfectly mobile in and out of the
industry, including free entry and exit of elements.
4) Consumers of the products produced, as well as the
producers themselves, have perfect and complete knowledge
of the market, that is, they know prices and costs of
inputs and outputs.
A pure monopoly is characterized by there being no
other producers or rivals. They are price makers in that
the price they set is the only price available to the
consumers.
An oligopoly is characterized by there being some com-
petition but not enough to eliminate the impact of any one
producer on the market. The actions of any one element
affect the rival elements. Because they are sensitive to
each other and yet each has the ability to affect market
price, there is considerable second guessing and tactical
maneuvering of the elements in an oligopoly.
The sablefish fishery, as do most other fisheries,
appear to best fit in the competitive industry type. Sable-
fish fishermen are price takers in that they individually
do not dictate or control the price they pay for their
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inputs or they receive for their outputs. Harvested sable-
fish are a homogeneous product in that the catch of one
fisherman is no different and thus commands the same market
price as any other. Fishermen are free to enter or exit
the industry. Currently there are no restrictions on entry
or migration from one area to another. Start-up costs, of
course, are high, but that does not preclude entry or exit.
Knowledge of prices and costs, though not perfect, are
public and available to both producers and consumers.
Since the sablefish fishery appears to fit the compet-
itive industry type best, the various micro-economic models
which pertain to the competitive industries would also
reasonably pertain to the sablefish fishery.
B. OPEN ACCESS EQUILIBRIUM
The operation of the freely competitive individual
fisherman and of the open access sablefish fishing industry
as a whole is depicted in Figure 1. The left-hand side
depicts the individual fisherman and the right the industry.
The MC curve represents the individual fisherman's marginal
cost curve as a function of the quantity harvested, q. The
AC curve represents his average cost curve as a function of
q. The D curve represents market demand as a function of
the total industry catch, Q. The S and S curves represent
industry supply curves as a function of Q. Specifically,
the S curve is the private cost curve, which represents
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costs. The Sg curve is the social cost curve, which
represents the S^ curve with the addition of additional
social costs as represented by s in Figure 1.
The intersection of the S supply curve and the demand
curve D, is the point of market equilibrium, where Q is
the quantity of sablefish harvested by the industry and p
is the prevailing market price. This long run, open access
equilibrium is achieved in the following means. First,
individual fishermen will initially adjust their efforts so
as to equate their marginal costs to the price of fish, p .
Only those fishermen will remain in the fishery whose
MC = p is equal to or greater than their average cost. The
Other fishermen would be operating at a loss and would even-
tually depart the fishery. Finally, in the long run, fishing
efforts will have been adjusted so that each fisherman is
operating at the level where long run average cost is at a
minimum and it equals the MC = p . At this long run, open
access equilibrium, fishermen are motivated to remain in
the fishery as long as their average revenues, which equals
price, p , times quantity, q, are equal to or greater than
their average costs.
By operating at the minimum of his average costs, the
individual fisherman is operating at his most efficient





According to Hyman [1973], an externality exists when
the production or consumption activities of one economic
unit affect the productivity or well being of another
economic unit and no compensation is paid for the externally
generated benefits or costs. When these costs are imposed
on a large number of people they are called social costs.
Traditional examples of such externalities are the various
forms of environmental pollution.
These externalities result in the market failing to
give proper signals concerning the true scarcity or valua-
tion of resources. In order to internalize these externali-
ties, that is force the producers to recognize the social
costs, government intervention is often required. Again,
the environmental pollution legislation and controls provide
an example.
The open access exploitation of a common property
resource, such as sablefish, involves externalities. An
example of an externality in the fishery is the operations
of one individual imposes costs on the other individuals
because he reduces the fish stock by his harvest, and thereby
increases unit costs for all the individuals in the fishery.
A precise determination of these costs, such that they
can be assessed, is extremely difficult. However, in general,
if the social costs, as represented by s in Figure 1, are
added to the private costs, they result in a new supply curve
as represented by S . The new intersection point of this
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supply curve, S^, with the demand curve, D, yields a quan-
tity Qg for the industry, which reflects the total private
and social costs of harvesting the fish. It also establishes
a new prevailing market price p . From this new price the
individual fisherman will establish a new set of operating
curves, which will include his accounting and assessment for
all or part of the social costs, and which will result in a
new long run equilibrium and new levels of individual efforts
Exactly how the individual fisherman's curves will change
depends on how completely the social costs are internalized
to them, the producers.
The existence of externalities in the sablefish fishery,
and the need for their internalization, is justification
for some form of government regulation of the fishery.
D. OPTIMAL INDUSTRY OUTPUT'
Since the unregulated, open access fishery fails to
internalize its externalities, and thus produces something
other than an optimal production output, it is desirable
to determine an optimal level of output. Anderson [1977]
,
Christy [1977] , Clark [1976] , Gordon [1954] , and Schaefer
[1957] , as well as others, have developed methods which can
be used to attempt to determine an optimal level of output.
The open access model ignores the fact that as the total
quantity harvested increases, there are fewer fish remaining
which are available to be caught. Over time, as the resource
is depleted, marginal social and private costs will increase
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as more effort is expended to harvest from a less dense
and smaller population. Additionally, as greater numbers
of fish are harvested, fewer remain to reproduce, which
slows the population replenishment rate.
Thus the quantity of fish caught is actually a function
of both the total amount of effort expended to catch fish
and the size of the fish population at the time. The size
of the population is a function of the previous efforts
expended to catch fish and the population growth rate.
Over a period of time, at a constant effort level, the fish
population will reach some equilibrium size. This will be
true up to some maximum effort level beyond which the fish
population cannot sustain itself. From this fact can be
produced the sustainable yield curve shown in Figure 2.
For any level of effort E^ through E* there is a corres-
ponding equilibrium catch level for which the fish popula-
tion can sustain itself. The maximum catch level, F., , atM
effort level E„^„ defines the maximum sustainable yield,MSY
the MSY, as referred to earlier. Increasing effort below
the E f^y effort level will increase the sustainable yield,
while increasing effort beyond the E y level will decrease
sustainable yield, until, at effort level E* sustainable
yield is zero.
By slightly modifying a technique demonstrated by
Anderson [1977] , the sustainable yield curve can be con-

























conversion is based on the assumption that the price of fish
remains constant and the cost of effort rises at an ever
increasing rate. The total cost curve is one of increasing
slope as costs of effort rise. The marginal revenue curve,
MRg, shows the change in revenue resulting from a change in
the production of effort, and is downward sloping because
the marginal catch per unit of effort decreases with increased
fishing intensity. The average revenue curve, AR„, shows
El
revenue per unit at each level of effort, and is downward
sloping because average catch per unit of effort also declines
with increased fishing intensity.
From Figure 3 it can be observed that the maximum profit,
which is the difference between total cost and total revenue,
is achieved at fishing effort Ej- This difference between
the total cost and total revenue curves is called economic
rent or economic profit. Traditionally, in economics, the
level of production which produces the maximum economic
profit, is predicted to be the level at which a monopolist
or sole owner of the resource would operate in order to
realize the maximum profits. Anderson [1977] has interpreted
this effort level, which produces the maximum economic profit,
E2/ to be the point of maximum economic yield, MEY. He
contends that this level of effort should be the optimal
allocation of effort to the fishery since the value to
society of the last unit of fish caught, the marginal revenue,
just balances the cost of providing it, the marginal cost.
The value to society, he contends, is not in the fact that
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profit is maximized to the fishery as a whole, but rather
that society's inputs are not being used to exploit the
fishery if they can be used more advantageously elsewhere.
As the optimal effort level it would produce the optimal
fishery output of fish. Thus, this effort level should be
the management objective for the fishery, the result of
the applied regulations.
Referring to Figure 3, it can be seen that the effort
level which produces the maximum economic yield may be less
than, equal to, or greater than the effort level which
produces the maximum sustainable, E , depending on the
shape of the total revenue and total cost curyes
.
Referring again to Figure 3, it can be demonstrated
that in an unregulated, open access fishery, fishing effort
will increase through new entry and expansion of effort
until an equilibrium, referred to as a bionomic equilibrium
by Gordon [1954], is reached at E-, the point where total
cost just equals total revenue. This is the same open
access equilibrium produced in Figure 1.
Anderson concludes that the reason there is a difference
between the equilibrium level of effort at E- and the opti-
mal allocation (for society) of effort at E^ is the fact
that in an unregulated fishery no one entity owns the fish
stock and can not therefore restrict others from harvesting.
Rather, fish can be harvested as fishermen please, and
since they are rational individuals, they will fish as long
as revenues exceed costs.
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The above models represent static portrayals of the
fishery. In fact, Anderson describes the maximum economic
yield, iMEY, as being a static maximum economic yield. He
indicates, and Clark [1976] more thoroughly develops, the
concept of a dynamic maximum economic yield, which primarily
includes the concept of time discounting. Time discounting
is essentially the application of an interest rate, often
referred to as the social discount rate, to monies and
resources. In an overly simplified explanation, it means
that the same dollar received or paid today is worth more
than if it were received or paid at a later date.
At a discount rate of zero, there is no change in value
over time. Clark has demonstrated that the dynamic economic
yield is the same as the static economic yield. At the
other extreme, with an infinite discount rate, the maximum
dynamic economic yield is the same as the open access,
unregulated equilibrium point. Clark concludes that the
optimal fishery effort level thus lies between these two
extremes as a function of the existing discount rate. This
value reflects the compromise between the desire for current
versus future revenues. Through a series of equations,
which are not presented here, Clark is able to calculate
a precise, dynamic, optimal level.
The above models can be made more representative of the
real world by the addition of anticipated changes in the
market demand as the tastes of consumers, prices of related

goods, and total income and income distribution of society
change.
Technological improvements and changes in demand for
the inputs of the capital and labor used in the fishery
will affect the models.
All of these additional considerations can be added to
the basic economic models, each changing the curves in some
comparatively small manner. However, the bottom line remains,
there is some effort level at which there is a maximum ->
economic profit available. This point represents the opti-
mal amount of effort, and its resultant harvest, which is
at the least cost to society. This value is optimal, not
because it maximizes profit to the fishery, but because it
guarantees that society's resources are being allocated so
as to maximize the social welfare. Furthermore, due to the
lack of central ownership of the fish population, the effort
level in an unregulated fishery at which the fishermen will
elect to fish, is something greater than the effort level
producing the maximum economic profit. The yield produced
at this unregulated level is sub-optimal, not only because
the profit of the fishery is less, but because society is
not making the best uses of its resources, including the
fishery, to maximize its welfare.
E. MAXIMUM SOCIAL YIELD
By going through the modeling analysis above, an effort
level which produces the maximum economic yield, MEY, can
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be determined. It guarantees that the net contribution
of the fishery to the economy as a whole is maximized through
economic efficiency. However, as Anderson [1977] points out,
economic efficiency is not the sole goal of society. Some
of the other goals of society which impact on a management
plan for the sablefish fishery include; 1) income redistri-
bution, 2) maintenance of balance of payments equilibrium,
3) reduction in overall unemployment, and 4) provision of
recreation activities. In some instances, striving for
economic efficiency may well assist in the achieving of
these other goals, while in other situations, the striving
for economic efficiency may well be acting contrary to the
objectives of the other goals. Therefore, in the situations
where the economic efficiency goals run contrary to another
goal of society, some form of compromise must be reached.
The level of effort which coincides with this compromise,
Anderson defines as producing the maximum social yield,
MScY .
Economic logic can be used to determine specifically
the effort level which will produce the MScY. To do so
requires a quantification of the other goals into a dollar
value. This may prove politically difficult, but is logically
feasible. The effort level of MScY is then the level at
which benefits of the other goals gained as quantified,
equals the loss in economic profits incurred by the move-
ment away from the level producing the MEY, which was
required to obtain the other goals.
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F. ECONOMICS OF REGULATIONS
The arguments developed in this section are primarily
the same as those developed by Lee Anderson in chapter 5
of his book The Economics of Fisheries Management .
Be it to achieve maximum economic yield or maximum
social yield, the problem that must be faced in developing
a management plan is how to change the amount of fishing
effort from the present, unregulated levels to the desired
levels. Before any regulation is proposed however, it must
be demonstrated that the improvements in yield offset the
costs of obtaining them. These costs include the costs of
management, related research, and enforcement.
Fishing effort is a function of four primary variables;
1) the number of fishing boats used in the fishery, 2) the
boats' individual harvesting power, 3) the spatial distribu-
tion of the boats, and 4) the total time spent fishing. In
order to affect effort levels, one or more of these variables
must be changed.
The primary regulatory methods used are, 1) area closures,
2) season closures, 3) maximum harvest quotas, 4) limitations
on the number of boats in the fishery, 5) gear restrictions,
6) taxes, and 7) licenses. Each of these methods reduces
effort levels by affecting one or more of the variables
of effort.
The first five of these methods of regulation function
by forcing some foinn of inefficiency on the fisherman. The
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remaining two can be implemented in such a manner that they
do not reduce the fisherman's efficiency.
1. Area Closures
Area closures restrict access to certain areas thus
requiring a greater expenditure of inputs on the part of
the fisherman to reach and return from open areas in which
he can fish.
2. Season Closures
Season closures limit the duration of use of capital
equipment to some fraction of the year. Additionally it
requires a more intense and thus more costly usage of equip-
ment and other input factors during open seasons in order
to produce efforts beyond the point where the time limit
becomes binding.
3. Maximum Harvest Quotas
Maximum harvest quotas prohibit further fishing once
a specified catch has been harvested. The effect on the
individual fisherman is to motivate him to increase his
fishing power, with concomitant increase in input costs,
so as to obtain a larger individual share of the quota.
Once quotas are achieved, capital equipment again lies idle.
4 . Limitations On The Number Of Boats
Limitations on the number of boats in the fishery
will, in the short run, reduce effort because it is not
possible to produce as much per period with the existing
boats. However, with no other restriction, the existing
boats will be motivated, at some increase in costs, to
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modify their boats to increase their productive capability
and thus producing a greater, less efficient effort level.
To be an effective regulatory method, the number of boats
in the fishery would have to be periodically reduced.
5. Gear Restrictions
Gear restrictions, which are the most direct form
of forced inefficiency, specifically retard fishing power.
These restrictions have the effect of forcing the fishermen
to use more costly methods to effect the same amount of
effort than would be used in an unregulated fishery.
The effect of regulation by forced inefficiency is
a reduction of efforts toward the desired levels, but at the
expense of increased unit costs to the individual fishermen.
Improvements are made from the unregulated fishery levels.-
However, the costs of inefficiencies prevent social welfare
from being maximized as compared to regulatory methods
which do not regulate by forced inefficiency.
6. Taxes
Taxes, on the other hand, as a regulatory device,
do not affect the efficiency of effort. Their impact
falls upon the results of . the total effort, rather than
the individual variables of effort. A properly designed
tax would reflect the difference between the average and
marginal revenues, for the fishery as a whole, as measured
at the MEY effort level. This effectively lowers the fisher-
man's average revenue down to his marginal revenue for the
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optimal effort level at MEY. The effect of such a tax is
to force some fishermen, the least efficient, who cannot
afford the increased total costs produced by the tax, out
of the fishery. The remaining fishermen, now producing at
the desired effort level, are motivated to remain at this
effort level because it is still their minimum average cost
value. The reduced effort, of course, reduces supply so
that the market price rises to a value which exactly offsets
the tax. Figure 4 is a graphic representation of this process
under an assumption of constant cost of industry supply.
The bottom line of such a tax as a method of regulation is
that the cost of producing effort has not changed and yet
the effort level has dropped to that which is desired. The
economic profit which exists at this desired effort level
is taken by the tax collector, that is, the government, who,
as the representative of the people, is the "owner" of the
fishery. The individual return to the fisherman, in the long
run, is exactly the same as it was before regulation. How-
ever, when the assumption of constant cost is dropped the
tax will cause some distortion in production methods.
The most practical means of levying this tax, since
effort levels are difficult to conveniently quantify, is
to place a unit tax on the fish harvested, the end product.
The amount of tax, again for simplicity assuming constant
costs, should be the difference in price per unit of fish,
at the desired level and the existing level as determined





Pj - net return to fisherman, p^ - price to the consumer
Ej^ - open access equilibrium, each boat producing it's E*
E* - open access equilibrium, with tax, each boat
producing E*
Po— p. = tax per unit of fish
E-— S* s reduction in total industry effort





Licenses, if properly designed, also do not affect
efficiency of effort. In contrast to the other regulatory
methods, which operate by pressuring the inefficient fisher-
man to leave the fishery "voluntarily", a licensing program
specifically excludes fishermen, beyond those licensed. ^^^
Because of this fact, this distributional problem becomes
the primary management concern.
Economically, licensing differs from taxation only
in the distribution of the economic profit. Under taxation,
this profit goes to the government. Under a licensing
program, it goes to the fishermen holding the licenses less
any fees paid to obtain the license. As far as resource
allocation is concerned, it does not matter who receives this
profit, for in either case, resources ar.e properly allocated
to the fishery.
Licensing, as regulation, works by granting to a
certain fisherman, the right to harvest a specific amount
of fish. Those who are granted licenses, are motivated to
seek the maximum economic yield effort level in order to
maximize their profits. Thus, they operate at the level
which produces the greatest efficiency, and therefore, with
the least cost to society. The end result is that social
welfare is maximized.
The number of licenses to be issued is such that the
optimal number of boats, each operating at minimal average
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cost of effort, are allowed to fish. If licenses are not
permanent, they should be at least of long enough life to
enable fishermen to make reasonable capital equipment
investment decisions.
Anderson proposes two methods of license distribution
which appear to be practical. The first is a grandfather
system with a government buy-back plan, in which all those
presently in the fishery are granted a license. The licenses
would be freely transferable. When the effort levels rose
above those desired, the government could buy back a certain
number of licenses to reduce the effort level to that desired.
A fisherman would be willing to sell if the offered purchase
price equalled or exceeded his anticipated discounted income
stream from continued fishing. Since the licenses would
be transferable, new entrants could successfully enter the
fishery with sufficient money to buy a license from a present
holder.
The second license distribution alternative proposed
by Anderson is a sale of licenses at auction. Present
fishermen would be in a favored position in the bidding
because of their existing equipment, skill and preparation.
As in the above alternative, a sale of a greater number of
licenses, with a buy-back plan would ease the problem of
resource transfer in and out of the fishery, given a desire
to either raise or lower the effort levels. This plan would
return most of the economic profit to the government through

the bid revenues. The total amount bid would approach the
maximum economic profit of the fishery.
The properly designed licensing system will allow
the proper amount of fish to be harvested with the least
cost in terms of resources foregone. Each fisherman will
operate as inexpensively as possible and in the long run will
be motivated to substitute new and more efficient equipment
and methods as old gear wears out. With the auction alterna-
tive, the most efficient fishermen will be able to bid
higher than less efficient competitors and will thus obtain
the licenses.
G. ECONOMIC CONCLUSIONS
As Huppert [1977] points out, the received body of
theory in fishery economics emphasizes the importance of
free access to fisheries as a source of social welfare loss.
Fishermen, privately maximizing their own profits, fail to
respond to the social costs of depleting the resource, and
as a group, will deplete the fish stock until the average
cost of production rises to equal the market price of fish.
Huppert goes on to say that the ideal economic solution to
this externality problem requires that the investment of
capital and labor in the fishery be prevented beyond the
point where incremental costs are justified by marginal
social returns. Christy 11977] has calculated an estimate
of the economic yield lost through free access competition
in the U.S. fisheries, in total, at $300 million annually.
fit^

Government intervention, therefore, through some fonn of
regulation, would appear necessary in order to internalize
this externality.
From an economic perspective, the primary factor to
be considered when designing any form of regulation is the
cost of instituting and enforcing it. The' benefits, to the
national economy as a whole, must outweigh the costs of
obtaining them. One of the most significant costs is going
to be in the acquisition of adequate data to determine proper
levels of regulation. Due to the dynamic nature of the
fishery and its market, data must be continually updated and
the regulations flexible enough, to allow proper adjustments
to be made. The ultimate goal of the regulations should
continue to be to maximize the social welfare by harvesting
the optimal amount of fish, obtained at the least cost
production methods.
Economic reasoning is but one tool available to the
Regional Councils to assist them in developing a management
plan for the sablefish. By its nature it transcends emotions
and politics which can otherwise cloud and confuse the
management problem. However, in itself, economic reasoning




The following regulatory alternatives are completely
original. The economic validity of taxation and licensing,




The problem facing the Regional Councils is one of
designing an optimal management plan for the sablefish
fishery. The regional nature of the Council provides them
much local insight into the management problem, but, at the
same time, subjects them to the strong localized political
pressure of special interests.
The plan must meet the requirements of the Act, and
yet it must be flexible enough to accommodate changes that
are required as new status information on the fishery popu-
lation is gathered, market demands change, and technological
improvements are made in harvesting and handling techniques.
As economics dictates, the benefits gained by the plan must
outweigh the costs of implementing it.
Essentially, the objectives of the plan should be threes
fold. It must first define the fishery and determine the
total allowable catch level. From the economic perspective,
this should be the effort level of the maximum social yield.
Secondly, it must determine a method of distributing or
allocating the total allowable catch to the fishermen.
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Thirdly, it must, through a feedback system, monitor the
fishery to determine if the plan objectives are accomplished,
and if not, what directions changes should be made in.
B. DATA REQUIREMENTS
To meet these objectives adequate data must be collected
in each of several categories. In order to define the fishery
the biological data, such as biomass, geographic distribu-
tion of biomass, reproductive, longevity and natural mortality
rates, migratory patterns, maximum and minimum critical
population levels, competition for niches at various popula-
tion levels, etc., must be determined. The end product of
the biological data should be the production of a sustainable
yield curve, disaggregated by geographic area if necessary.
The fishery, of course, includes the fishermen as well.
So, such data as the present number of boats available,
their geographic distribution, their fishing power, their
costs of operation, including both labor and capital costs,
and the market prices of inputs and outputs, both present
and forecast, should be determined. The end product of this
data are the various cost and revenue curves for the fishery,
including marginal, average and total revenue and cost
curves for the individual fisherman and the industry.
Data, which can be used to predict the costs of manage-
ment, data collection, and enforcement must be determined
so that the administrative costs of implementing the alterna-
tive plans can be determined.
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Given that the above data can produce, for the Council,
the total allowable catch for the fishery, the additional
and subtle data of socio-economic pressures, geographic
employment levels, balance of trade, recreation, and pure
and simple political pressures must be ascertained and
weighed when determining the distribution of the total
allowable catch.
Finally, for the feedback system, data from all the
above sources must be continually inputed and monitored
by the Council in order that modifications to the plan
can be made as necessary.
C. ADDITIONAL CRITERION
If some form of regulation is to be a necessary part
of the plan, it -should not be regulation through forced
inefficiency, but rather such that it provides the optimal
harvest at the least cost of supplying the total quantity
of fish caught.
The plan should be such as to encourage innovation and
the development of new and improved harvesting, handling,
and processing techniques.
In order to maintain equity and vitality in the fishery,
the plan should allow for ease of entry and exit of fishermen,
Finally, the plan should be such that it encourages





It would appear that there are but three basic alterna-
tive management techniques available to the Regional Council
for the sablefish fishery. All three make the assumption
that domestic fishing pressure is great enough that foreign
fishermen would be excluded from the fishery.
The first alternative would be the maintenance of the
status quo. That is, there would be no regulation of the
domestic fishermen within the fishery.
The second alternative would be a form of regulation
of the fishery, through the establishment of a tax on fish
landed per unit of fish.
The third alternative would also be a form of regulation
of the fishery, through the establishment of a licensing
program, in which licenses are granted to harvest a pre-
scribed amc5unt of fish.
E. ALTERNATIVE 1
The first alternative is to continue with the regulations
as prescribed by the preliminary management plan for sable-
fish as prepared by the Secretary of Commerce. This plan
essentially provides for no restrictions of domestic fishing
operations. It excludes foreign directed fisheries for
sablefish and sets certain maximum incidental catch limits
for foreign trawl fishing operations directed at other species
such as hake. An incidental catch would be defined as the
catch of any species of fish other than that for which the

fishing operation is directed. The supposition of this plan
is that the total allowable catch is being nearly completely
harvested by the domestic fishermen such that none remains
available for the foreign fishermen.
This alternative has the least enforcement costs. There
are essentially no federal enforcement costs for the domestic
fishery. To ensure that no foreign directed fishing is taking
place, some form of periodic surveillance patrols, such as
aircraft patrols, would be necessary. These patrols would
not have to be very frequent, however, for the chances of
a foreign directed fishing operation coming in, setting gear
and retrieving it without being spotted and reported by
domestic vessels would be slim. Aircraft patrols, in fact,
would seem to have the greater value as "presence" and
assurance to the domestic fishermen, that the patrolman
on the beat is doing his job.
Enforcement costs would continue to exist, as they do
today, in the area of gear conflicts. As long as the foreign
fishery operations for any species are conducted in the
proximity of domestic sablefish fishing operations, there
exists the potential for gear conflicts.
The enforcement of the incidental catch limits for
sablefish by the foreign trawl vessels would require no
additional costs. These vessels would be regularly and
routinely located and boarded as a function of the enforce-
ment of their directed fishing operations. These boardings
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would be conducted to ensure compliance with applicable
regulations for their fishery, including incidental catch
restrictions. Additionally, some of these vessels may have
U.S. observers on board to continually assure compliance
with the law.
This alternative has the least administrative costs
because of its simplicity. Few people and little hardware
are required to monitor it.
Data collection costs, however, may be greater under
this alternative than under other more restrictive alterna-
tives. This alternative produces only a slight amount of
data in itself because of the fact that there are no domestic
regulations or geographic breakdowns of the fishery. Thus,
if additional data is necessary, it must be collected by an
additional, and thus more costly, means.
There are two primary advantages to this alternative.
First, it is the least cost and least complicated alterna-
tive. Second, it is the least disruptive of present fishing
operations, and thus, likely to be the most politically
acceptable, because of its acceptance by the fishermen. It
keeps the "foreigners" out and allows complete freedom to
the U.S. fishermen.
There are several disadvantages to this alternative.
First and foremost, it does not appear to be economically
sound. From an economic perspective, it is unlikely that
the open access domestic fishery would be operating at a
level that is less than the desired optimal level unless
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the total fishery is underutilized, which would mean that
the total allowable catch is actually being understated.
If this is the case, then the domestic fishery is not, in
fact, harvesting up to the total allowable catch level,
and therefore, under the provisions of the Act, the foreign
fishing operations should be allowed in. On the other hand,
if the open access domestic fishery is exceeding the optimal
level, this alternative fails to optimally manage the resource
In which case, it is not meeting the requirements of the Act
either.
Additionally, due to the generally localized nature of
the domestic fishing operations, if the biological data
indicates that severe local depletion is detrimental to
the fishery as a whole, this alternative does not provide
a means of discouraging severe overfishing and critical
resource depletion in a local area. Likewise, it does not
encourage new fishing in presently underutilized areas.
Finally, the lack of domestic regulation provides no
check on the potential increase in fishery effort levels --
above the total allowable catch that would arise following
a significant increase in market demand. Such an increase
could be brought on by foreign entry, in large quantities,
into the market.
This alternative would appear to be a fine interim
alternative, quite satisfactory for the preliminary manage-
ment plan. However, for the longer term, it does not appear




The second alternative is to regulate the domestic
fishery through the imposition of a tax on the fish harvested,
Such a tax would be collected at a rate applied per unit of
fish landed. If determined necessary, it could be broken
down and applied at different rates for different sizes or
different geographic areas. A starting premise of this
alternative also is that the foreign directed fishery opera-
tions would be excluded from the sablefish fishery because
the domestic capability exceeds the optimal harvest level.
Foreign trawl fishing operations directed at other species
would have a maximum incidental limit set for sablefish.
The purpose of the tax would be to discourage the
least efficient fishermen from remaining in the fishery,
thus reducing the total effort level down to the desired
level. The exact size of the tax would be calculated from
projections of market demand and industry costs. The tax
would be such that it could be completely passed through
to the consumer, so that there would be no change in the
average revenues received by the fishermen.
If the biological data suggested that the total fishery
should be managed in smaller geographic units, the taxes
could be set by these individual geographic areas. This
would, of course, be more complicated and would drive up
administrative and enforcement costs.
The revenues received through the tax collection could
be used to offset management, administrative, research.
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and enforcement costs as well as to assist, in some manner,
the relocation and re-employment of the displaced fishermen.
Foreign enforcement would be the same as under alterna-
tive 1. Domestic enforcement would be in two primary areas.
First, some enforcement effort must be applied at the various
landing points to tally the catches as they are landed to
ensure that the proper tax is assessed. This landing point
enforcement would logically be conducted by the State Fish
and Game agencies with National Marine Fisheries Service
assistance. Second, some enforcement effort would have to
be made to prevent a black market in untaxed sablefish being
established. This effort could be much the same as other
anti-smuggling efforts conducted by the Coast Guard and
Customs.
The costs of this alternative would be higher than those
of alternative 1. The primary cost increases v/ould be in
enforcement and in the data collection and analysis in order
to determine the proper amount of tax to assess. However,
some data collection costs could decrease slightly from
alternative 1 levels, in that data can be collected in con-
cert with the enforcement and management of the fishery.
Consumer costs could be expected to rise significantly
as the tax is passed through to them. The new market prices,
however, should be thought of as reflecting the true value
of the sablefish to society.
The primary advantage of this alternative is that it
should meet the criterion of the Act to optimally manage
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the sablefish fishery. It does so without specifically
limiting entry or exit from the fishery. It encourages the
development of new and more efficient technology. Finally,
taxation can be used to encourage the development of presently
underutilized areas.
There are several disadvantages however. The first of
which is that much resistance to taxation as a means of
regulation, can be expected from the fishermen themselves.
After all, this is a form of regulation on a heretofore
unregulated fishery. Those with the loudest objections,
of course, could be expected to be the least efficient fisher-
men, those who would be unable to cope with the tax and
thus "forced" to leave the fishery. The most efficient, on
the other hand, would be expected to complain little.
The consumer, too, would be expected to complain as the
market price of sablefish jumps substantially.
Both of these groups, fishermen and consumers, could be
expected to put considerable pressure on the Regional Coun-
cil to not regulate the fishery at all. Due to their very
regional makeup the Regional Council would be vulnerable
to such localized political pressure. The large percentage
of industry representation on the Council itself could be
expected to put strong internal pressure to avoid such an
alternative as taxation.
Another disadvantage is in the complexity of the tax
determination process. It would be a complicated process,
continually affected by changes in market demand and industry
76

costs. Consequently, the tax rates would have to be con-
tinually assessed and when necessary, changed. This would
be even more complicated if taxes were determined on a geo-
graphic or size of fish basis.
Finally, and perhaps the greatest disadvantage of all
is that, subject to interpretation of the Act itself, such
a landing tax may not be authorized as a management tool.
Depending on how the Act is interpreted, it neither provides
for, nor specifically prohibits such a tax. A definitive
ruling is needed on this matter.
G. ALTERNATIVE 3
The third alternative is to regulate the domestic fishery
through a licensing program which in effect limits access
to the fishery and prescribes a maximum amount of fish which
can be harvested per license. Again, a starting premise
of this alternative is that the foreign directed fishery
operations would be excluded from the sablefish fishery
because the domestic capability exceeds the optimal harvest
level. Foreign trawl fishing operations, directed at other
species, would have a maximum incidental catch limit set
for sablefish.
These licenses would provide an allocation of the desired
effort level for the fishery. They would provide, to the
recipient, the right to harvest a certain amount of fish
within a prescribed time period.
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As in alternative 2, if the biological data suggested
that the total fishery should be managed in smaller geo-
graphic units, the licenses could prescribe geographic areas
as well. ThiS/ of course, would be more complicated and
would drive up administrative and enforcement costs.
Foreign enforcement would be the same as under alterna-
tive 1. Domestic enforcement, as in alternative 2, would
be in two primary areas'. The first area of enforcement would
be at the various landing points to tally the catches as
they are landed, to ensure a proper license is held and to
calculate the balance remaining to be caught under the
terms of that license. Again, the landing point enforcement
would logically be conducted by the State Fish and Game
agencies with National Marine Fisheries Service assistance.
Secondly, as in alternative 2, some enforcement would be
necessary to prevent a black market in unlicensed sablefish.
This effort would probably be less, at sea at least, than
under alternative 2, because it would be easier to detect
an unlicensed vessel fishing for sablefish. At sea, the
Coast Guard would be the primary enforcement agency.
The costs of this alternative would be higher than
under alternative 1, and depending on the method of distribu-
tion of licenses selected, probably less than alternative 2.
Enforcement costs should be slightly less than alternative
2. Data collection and analysis costs should definitely
be less than the taxation alternative. Not as much data
would be required to make management decisions unless a
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very complicated distributional scheme was designed. If
the data indicated more fishing effort could safely be
expended, new licenses could be granted, and if effort
should be restricted further, old licenses need not be
renewed.
Consumer costs could be expected to rise significantly
as the supply of fish is reduced to that of the desired
effort level. Again, the new market prices should be
thought of as reflecting the true value of sablefish to
society.
Under this alternative, the potential exists for the
development of a futures market for sablefish. A fish
broker could buy a fisherman's catch, which he had been
authorized to harvest by the license, in advance of him
actually harvesting the fish. Thus, the fisherman secures
a fixed, predetermined amount of money in advance, and the
broker guarantees himself a fixed amount of fish at some
predetermined time in the future. Through the fisherman's
and broker's election to participate in the futures market
or not, they can assume the amount of risk, or gain the
amount of security they desire. The futures market has the
potential to improve market efficiency, and through that,
benefit the consumer with lower costs.
This alternative, as does alternative 2 as well, because
of the fisherman's freedom to harvest his quota at any time
during the year, has the potential to provide fresh fish,
on a regular basis, to the market place through the entire
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year. This capability enhances the fresh fish market,
through continuous availability to the consumer, and
enables the processing industries to operate year round.
These are significant advantages in an overall industry
that is characterized by only seasonal availability of
many species.
The primary advantage of this alternative is that it,
like alternative 2, can meet the criterion of the Act to
optimally manage the sablefish fishery. However, depending
on the method of allocation, it does so at the expense
of a restriction in free access and exit from the fishery.
Depending on the license distribution method, it may or
may not encourage the development of new and more efficient
technology.
The primary problem with this alternative is the com-
plexity and difficulty in selecting a just and equitable
license distribution system. Some of the different methods
of distribution are listed below with their pros and cons.
1. Lottery
A lottery could be conducted to distribute the
licenses, in which applications are submitted and then
drawn in a random manner. This would be a most equitable
method, if equitable means every party has an equally likely
chance of obtaining a license or not. The problems with
this method are that, first, it does not require efficiency
to be successful in obtaining a license. Because of this it
does not encourage development of technological improvements
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or a better understanding of sablefish life history and
behavior. Unless the licenses are multi-year in length,
fishermen would not be encouraged to make the capital
investments necessary. A lottery provides no protection
to -those presently in the fishery who have already made
the capital investments.
2. Grandfather System
In order to reduce the impact of imposing regulation
on the existing fishery, a different method of distribution
would be to grant licenses to all those presently in the
system. A difficulty arises in reducing the number of
outstanding licenses to the desired effort level. One
method would be to restrict all others from entry and with-
draw licenses from the system as present holders retire,
until the desired level is achieved. This process could
prove to be not very timely and therefore, ineffective.
A modification of this system would have the govern-
ment buy back the number of outstanding licenses necessary
to restrict the effort level to that desired. A fisherman
would sell when the purchase price approximates the present
value of his anticipated income stream from continued fishing,
Holdouts would tend to benefit the most, as others left and
the return per unit effort of the fishery increased as well
as the value of the license increasing by the very nature
of there being fewer outstanding.
A major objection of this buy back program would
arise from the fact that money to buy back the outstanding
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licenses would come from general funds. Thus it would be
a form of subsidization of the fishery by the rest of the
economy
.
Another modification of this distribution method
would have the licenses freely transferrable. This would
enable freedom of entry and exit from the fishery. In
order to enter, a prospective fisherman need only have the
desire and adequate money to buy out an existing license
holder. The government would continue to manage the total
number of licenses outstanding by buying back or selling
additional licenses as necessary.
3. Auction
Another method of distribution would be to offer
the licenses for sale through an auction. The number of
licenses offered up for sale could be either the number
that would produce the desired effort level immediately or
some number in excess of that with a buy back plan so that
fluctuations in the desired effort level could be more easily
accommodated. The competitive bidding would tend to encour-
age efficiency of operation in order for the bidder to
I
maximize his return. This method would te-nd to protect the
interests of the existing fishermen, especially the most
efficient, since they would have already made the invest-
ments in capital equipment. This method would probably
have better public support than some of the others in that
the revenues collected in the bidding process would go
into the general funds.
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A major potential disadvantage of this proposal is
that, depending on how the wording of the Act is inter-
preted, it too may not be authorized by the Act. The Act
does not address specifically, competitive bidding as a
means of limiting access to the fishery (Sec. 303, b.).
However, it does address fees (Sec. 304, d.), and specifically
prescribes that fees charged, pursuant to the issuing of
permits, shall not exceed the administrative costs incurred
in issuing those permits. If one elects to interpret the
bids as fees for a permit, they would be unauthorized.
However, if there is a minimum bid required, and it is
established as a function of administrative costs, it would
be in compliance with the Act, and bids in excess of the
minimum could fall into a category other than fees for per-
mits. A court clarification or a legislative change could
clarify the issue.
In addition to these methods of distribution there
are undoubtedly countless other methods as well. If the
Regional Council were to select this licensing alternative
they would have to weigh the various pros and cons of each
distributional scheme in setting up the optimal management
plan for the sablefish fishery.
Before the Council may select any alternative which
proposes to limit access to the fishery they must take into
account, as required by Sec. 303,6,6, the:
(A) present participation in the fishery,




(C) the economics of the fishery,
(D) the capability of fishing vessels used in the
fishery to engage in other fisheries,
(E) the cultural and social framework relevant to the
fishery, and
(F) any other relevant considerations.
These factors, quite obviously, are subject to different
interpretations as to meaning and requirements. The dis-
advantage then, is that these different interpretations
become the arguments for, or the arguments against a pro-





Coast Guard planners, when attempting to determine the
long range Coast Guard requirements for fisheries law
enforcement/ must consider the suggested alternative manage-
ment plans which may be developed and eventually implemented
by the Regional Councils. Coast Guard planning, programming,
and budgeting (PPB) should reflect the significant range
of Coast Guard requirements necessary to enforce the possible
alternative management plans.
In order to insure that accurate enforcement costs are
considered and applied in the development of viable manage-
ment plans, the Coast Guard should become actively involved
in the plan development process. Excessive enforcement
costs should cause the Regional Councils to exclude from
consideration any alternative.
The Coast Guard image, of the good guy in the white hat,
will probably be affected by the enforcement of these new
domestic regulations. To cope with this, the Coast Guard
should play an active role in informing the industry and
the public of the new Coast Guard requirements and of the
plan objectives.
B. REGIONAL COUNCILS
The regional makeup of the Regional Council subjects
them to strong local political and social pressures. Thus,

the importance of the regional fishing industry may loom
larger than national interests. Management plans developed
may well be oriented to improve the economic wealth of
regional elements of the industry at the expense of the
nation as a whole. Such a plan might be one in which large
national inputs are made for research and administration
while calling for no fees from the fishermen or placing
little or no restrictions upon them, the beneficiaries of
the plan.
On the other hand, the national objectives and standards
sections of the Act, as well as the oversight role of the
Secretary of Commerce, should act to restrain the Regional
Councils from acting in a nationally nonbeneficial manner.
An additional concern is that these regionally oriented
managers and industry representatives on the Council may
act, as Crutchfield [1977] points out, as a minority veto
power, capable of paralyzing effective action by the Council
He points out further, that the record of regional fishery
commissions, such as the Pacific Marine Fishery Commission,
is not encouraging with respect to the boldness of their
actions in this kind of organization.
Thus, the Regional Councils require strong dynamic
leadership, with active participation by economists to
reflect social costs, enforcement agencies to reflect
enforcement costs and feasibilities, consumer groups to
represent consumer interests, and marketers to forecast
domestic and foreign demand.
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The Regional Councils should try to avoid the paralysis
of perfection that commonly grips planning bodies. The
threat is that for want of a little more data a "perfect
plan" could be developed. A sufficient level of data should
be determined, and when achieved, the plan should be developed
from it. From the best data available, the plan should
be developed, and it should be designed so the plan itself
will generate information needed to more accurately and
precisely manage the fishery. The plan should have the
flexibility to change and accommodate new developments or
revelations from generated information.
C. ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC PROFIT
From an economic perspective, it matters little who
collects the economic profit generated by optimal fishing
effort levels, be it the fishermen or the government.
Politically, however, it would appear to matter. If the
government can directly collect these profits and then
allocate them to the expenditures made for enforcement,
research and development, and administration, it would appear
superior to indirectly collecting them via the fishermen's
expenditures into the economy as a whole. If the Office of
Management and Budget, who is desperately looking for corners
to cut to reduce federal spending, is faced with funding
these costs without some form of offsetting revenues, they
may feel compelled to severely limit the funds for fishery
research, management, and enforcement, which could result
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in suboptimal management of the fishery. To the taxpayer
it would appear, that the Act intends, in the section stating
only administrative costs can be recovered directly, that
he, the general taxpayer, is to foot the bill for fishery
research, management, and enforcement, without receiving
any direct benefit.
D. RECREATIONAL FISHING
This thesis has primarily examined the fishery manage-
ment problem from the perspective of managing the commercial
industry and has completely ignored the recreational fishing
aspects. This was warranted in the sablefish fishery because
there appears to be only little recreational fishing pressure
However, in other fisheries, the recreational aspect is very
significant. The integration and balancing of commercial
interests with recreational interests considerably compli-
cates the management problem. The fact that recreationalists
are seeking pleasure and an experience, of which the capture
and consumption of fish is only a segment, makes costing
and yield determination more difficult. If "trophy" size
fish are the recreational fisherman's objective rather than
pounds of flesh which the commercial fishermen desire, then
the optimal yield curves for the recreational fishery would
be different than those for the commercial fishery. In
general, there has been little economic analysis done of
the recreational fishery.

The problem of evaluating all segments of the fishery,
including recreational, and designing and implementing




The management alternative selected by the Regional
Council will depend on many things. A management plan
such as alternative 1, which is essentially no domestic
control, would only seem appropriate if the costs of research,
management, and enforcement outweigh the benefits to be
gained from the fishery. It would seem unlikely that this
would be the case in the sablefish fishery.
If fishing efforts are to be regulated through taxation,
then the problems of interpretation of the Act would have to
be clarified or the Act modified such that taxation can be
used effectively. Additionally, revenues collected should
be earmarked to offset costs of research, management, and
enforcement, such that the management plan can be more
clearly defined, justified, and consequently, publically
accepted.
If fishing efforts are to be regulated through a permit or
licensing method, then the very politically sensitive prob-
lem of distribution will have to be addressed. If revenues
are collected they should be applied to cover research,
management, and enforcement costs, as well as to any buy
back programs, if applicable. If insufficient revenues are
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collected to offset these costs, then the benefits accrued
by the fishermen, the portion of the economic profit they
retain, will have to be determined in order to establish
and maintain desired effort levels.
If some other alternative is selected, it should be
such that it meets the justification of maximizing the
social welfare from the fishery as well as meeting the
requirements of the Act.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
As a result of this thesis work the following areas
would appear to merit further analysis.
1) What should be the composition and organization of
the Regional Councils in order to be effective and effi-
cient in developing and maintaining management plans for
the maximum benefit of the nation?
2) How can the Coast Guard determine, on the long and
short range horizons, the resources necessary to enforce
the Council developed management plans?
3) Develop a workable economic model to maximize the
social welfare gained from fishery resources, which could
be used by the Regional Councils.
4) What is the potential impact of foreign entry in
the domestic fish markets?
5) How does a prospective individual fisherman determine




CONTINENTAL SHELF FISHERY RESOURCES
The term "Continental Shelf Fishery Resources" means
the following:
Colenterata
Bamboo Coral - Acanella spp.
Black Coral - Antipathes spp.
Gold Coral - Callogorgia spp.
Precious Red Coral - Corallium spp.
Bamboo Coral - Keratoisis spp.
Gold Coral - Parazoanthus spp.
Crustacea
Tanner Crab - Chionoecetes tanneri
Tanner Crab - Chionoecetes opilio
Tanner Crab ~ Chionoecetes angulatus
Tanner Crab - Chionoecetes bairdi
King Crab - Paralithodes camtschatica
King Crab - Paralithodes platypus
King Crab - Paralithodes brevipes -
Lobster - Homarus americanus
Dungeness Crab - Cancer magister
California King Crab - Paralithodes californiensis
California King Crab - Paralithodes rathbuni
Golden King Crab - Lithodes aequispinus
Northern Stone Crab - Lithodes maja
Stone Crab ~ Menippe mercenaria
Deep-sea Red Crab - Geryon quinquedens
Mollusks
Red Abolone ~ Haliotis rufescens
Pink Abolone - Haliotis corrugata
Japanese Abolone - Haliotis kamtschatkana
Queen Conch - Strombus gigas
Surf Clam - Spisula solidissima
Ocean Quahog - Artica islandica
Sponges
Glove Sponge - Hippiospongia canaliculata
Sheepswool Sponge - Hippiospongia lachne
Grass Sponge - Spongia graminea
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